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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WELBY AAGARD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
DAYTON & MILLER
RED-E-MIX CONCRETE
COMPANY and
THOMAS CHARLES COO~
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9373

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this Brief we will refer to Plaintiff and
Appellant as Plaintiff, and Defendants and Respondents as Defendants. The Record will be referred
to by R., and the Transcript of Testimony will be
referred to by the letters Tr.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts in the Appellant's
Brief deals principally with portions of the testimony of the two drivers involved. In this Statement
1
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we will endeavor to point out additional facts concerning the physical conditions of the highway where
the accident occurred, the physical evidence as to
the nature and point of contact between the two
vehicles, and addi tiona! testimony given by the drivers and witnesses so there will be a more complete
picture of the evidence that was before the Trial
Court.
U. S. Highway 30 South run~ generally east
and west between Morgan and Devil's Slide, Utah.
The accident occurred approximately two miles west
of Devil's Slide at a point where the Highway forms
an ''S" type curve and passes, at an angle, under
a railroad overpass. The traveled portion of the
highway is somewhat restricted by the cement abutments of the overpass and is 22 feet in width without shoulders. (See Ex. 1 through 11 -Scale Diagram and correlated photographs) .
The bed and rack of plaintiff's sheep truck was
7¥2 feet wide, 16 feet long, and was 9 feet 4 inches
high from the ground. The rack was equipped with
,an upper and lower deck, and at the time of the
accident was loaded with 56 lambs on the top deck
and 44 lambs on the lower deck, each weighing
'approximately 75 pounds (R. 9, 10).
The points of contact on defendant's readymix cement truck were on the left end of a water
supply tank located above and behind the truck's
2
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cab and on the left rear corner of a fender platform over the rear dual tires. There was only slight
damage to the defendants' truck (Tr. 3~9, 60, 61,
110- Ex. 12, 13, 14).
The points of contact on plaintiff's truck were
the angle iron uprights along the left side of the
rack. Trooper Mason W. Hill of the Utah Highway
Patrol, who investigated, described the damage oh
plaintiff's truck as starting very light toward the
front and getting a little more severe as it went to
the rear of the rack, and referred to the damage as
indicating a very light impact (Tr. 59).
Clifford Bloomquist, driver of plaintiff's truck,
testified that he passed through the underpass headed west and was about 21f2 truck lengths west of it
when he first saw defendants' truck coming around
the curve toward him, that it was on his side of
the road about 200 feet away, that he knew there
was going to be an accident, but he did not apply
his brakes ( Tr. 22, 23, 24). Bloomquist fixed the
position of defendants' truck on the highway by
reference to two painted yellow dividing lines (Tr.
22). Officer Hill testified that the road through
the underpass was newly surfaced (Tr. 53, 54),
and the absence of a center line is noted on his
investigation work sheet (Ex. B.).
Trooper Hill first interviewed Bloomquist approximately an hour after the accident. At that
3
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time plaintiff's truck was parked 2/lOths of a mile
west of the underpass and was about 50 or 75 feet
off the highway. The sheep that he had been carrying were on a side hill ('Tr. 36).
Trooper Hill testified as to his conversation
with Bloomquist as follows (Tr. 36, 37):
"Q. What did you do then, Mr. Hill?
A. I asked this gentleman if he was the
driver, and he told me he was. I asked him
what happened, and he informed me that the
cement truck had sideswiped him in the underpass. I asked him where the driver was
and he said that the cement truck had not
stopped.
Q. Now, did you go up to the underpass
at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you able to see any signs on
the road or around there, Mr. Hill, that indicated the point of impact or the place where
this had occurred?
A. No, I didn't. I ·could not find any
place showing the point of impact."
And again on cross examination regarding his
conversation with Bloomquist, Trooper Hill testified (Tr. 54):
"A. I asked Mr. Bloomquist what had
happened and he told me that a cement truck
had sideswiped him in the underpass.
Q. In the underpass?
A. Yes.''
Thomas Cook had been driving a cement truck
4
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for the defendant, Dayton & Miller, for nine months
prior to the accident ('Tr. 102). He was familiar
with the highway and the area in question and had
made five trips by there the previous week (Tr.
103). As he approached the underpass traveling
east, he was hugging the right shoulder of the road
traveling 25 mph. (Tr. 106, 107). As he reached
the west end of the underpass he observed plaintiff's truck rounding the curve approaching the
underpass from the east at a pretty fast rate of
speed. It appeared to be on its own side of the road
as it rounded the curve, but as it passed defendants'
truck it looked very close, and then Cook heard a
noise like someone running a stick along a picket
fence (Tr. 107, 108). He saw the rear of plaintiff's
truck going under the underpass in his rear view
mirror. He pulled off and parked his truck on the
shoulder of the road at the first point that was wide
enough, approximately 600 or 700 feet east of tne
underpass. Witnesses Jerome C. Rush and Ethel
Rush were at their car preparing a picnic lunch
at approximately where Cook stopped. Cook walked
west back through the underpass. He could see dust
arising from the ground, but plaintiff's truck was
not in sight (Tr. 108, 120, 132, 13'3).
Both witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Rush, had observed plaintiff's truck. As it passed them it was
coming fast (Tr. 123, 132). They then heard a
5
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crash (Tr. 123, 130). They could not see the underpass from where they were ('Tr. 128).
This case was tried to the court sitting without
a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the case was
taken under advisement and the court subsequently
entered its judgment in favor of the defendants.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT.
POINT II.
THE TESTIMONY OF THOMAS CHARLES COOK
IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
AND FACTS AS CONTENDED BY DEFENDANTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT.

'The trial court, in rendering its judgment,
made the following finding:
"That the evidence was evenly balanced
as to 'vhich of the parties was negligent"
The defendants, having prevailed at the trial
court, are now entitled to have the evidence viewed
in the light most favorable to them: W eenig Bros. v.
Manning, 1 Ut. 2d 101, 26'2 P. 2d 491.
This court also in the W eenig Case, supra, in
considering the burden of an appellant in seeking a
review of a trial court's finding of fact, stated as
follows:
6
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"In order to upset the judgment and command one in its favor the first obstacle plaintiff must overcome is to demonstrate that
the evidence shows with such certainty that
reasonable minds could not differ thereon,
that the defendant was guilty of negligence
which proximately caused the collision. In
the absence of such degree of proof we could
not direct that such finding be made andreverse the. decision of the lower court."
Plaintiff claims defendants' truck was on the
wrong side of the road. The evidence of physical
damage to the vehicles indicated a minor sideswiping type of collision between the left side of plain-tiff's truck rack and the left rear corner of defendants' truck. This contact could as logically have
resulted from plaintiff's truck swinging over into
defendants' path as plaintiff's driver started to
enter the underpass or from the close proximity of
both trucks to the center of the road because of the
restrictive conditions of the underpass.
The fact that the end of the water supply tank
on defendants' truck was scraped by plaintiff's
rack without any contact being made with defendants' rear view mirror, which extended beyond
the width of the mixer and tank, when viewed with
the further fact that the amount of impact and
damage on plaintiff's sheep rack on the left side increased in severity toward the rear, is strong evidence that plaintiff's truck was leaning and crossing
7
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over into the path of defendants' truck as it passed.
So also the physical effect of such a contact would
be to swing the front of plain tiff's truck to its left
rather than pushing it to its right and off the road
as testified to by plaintiff's driver ( Tr. 7).
It is now a well established rule in this jurisdiction, and the weight of authority generally, that
a plaintiff, in order to prevail, must establish the
negligence of the defendant and its proximate cause
to plaintiff's damage by a preponderance of the evidence, and where the evidence is evenly balanced as
to· which of two or more probable causes resulted
in the damage complained of, plaintiff has failed
to sustain his burden. ·The rule was stated thus in
the early case of Tremelling v. Southern Pacific Co.,
51 Utah 189, 170 Pac. 80 (p. 83):
· "If the probabilities are equally balanced
that the accident was produced by a cause for
which the defendant is responsible or by one
for which he is not, the plaintiff must fail."
This rule has been followed consistently in Utah,
Perrin v. U.P.R.R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 Pac. 405,
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, 103 Utah 44, 132 P. 2d
680, Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 134, 279 P. 2d 1073,
In Re Richards, 5 Utah 2d 106, 2'9'7 P. 2d 542.
The plaintiff on argument in his brief refers
to the testimony of driver Bloomquist as clear, unequivocal and consistent. Mr. Bloomquist testified
8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on cross-examination that when he first saw defendants' truck it was 200 feet away, that it was
completely on his side of the road and he knew there
was going to be an accident, but he didn't touch
his brakes or reduce his speed. (Tr. 23, 24, 28, 29).
It is submitted that such is not consistent with the
reactions of a normally prudent driver. Again when
Trooper Hill first interviewed Bloomquist within
an hour after the accident, Bloomquist stated that
a cern en t truck had sideswiped him in the underpass (Tr. 36, 54), not somel 200 feet west of the
underpass where, as a matter of fact, the underpass
would have had no ·connection with the accident.
POINT II.
THE TESTIMONY OF THOMAS CHARLES COOK
IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
AND FACTS AS CONTENDED BY DEFENDANTS.

The plaintiff cites the case of Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal Company, 16 Utah 348, 52 Pac. 594,
for the rule of law that a party is bound by the testimony he gives. He contends that the testimony of
Cook to the effect that he did not observe the plaintiff's truck on the wrong side of the road precludes
the finding that he was ever on the wrong side of
the road.
Defendant is in full accord with the rule as
stated in the Fowler case. However, defendant's
testimony that he didn't see the plaintiff's truck
encroaching upon his side of the road is not incon9
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sistent, as contended by the plaintiff, with the physical facts· indicating that he was. Further, the rule
of law contains an e~ception within the rule itself.
Thus, a party's material statement of fact may
negative his defense unless:
"More favorable testimony appears to
contradict or modify ... " (169 ALR 798,
799, cited in Appellant's Brief, Page 17.)
There are two reasons why this rule is of no
aid or comfort to the plaintiff. First, the fact that
Cook may not have seen the plaintiff driving upon
the wrong side of the road does not preclude the fact
that he did violate the defendant's right of way
as supported by the established facts.
Cook, in his testimony regarding the position
of the plaintiff's truck, stated (Tr. 108):
"Q. Did he appear to be on his side of
the road?
A. He was when he was coming around
the corner, he was on his side.
Q. All right, go ahead.
A. As he passed me it looked like he
was very close and it sounded like somebo_d~
running down the picket fence with a sticK.
Q. Did you feel anything?
A. No."
It is to be observed that there was no center
dividing line on the road, and any statements regarding the truck's position upon the highway were
10
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of necessity based upon estimates. The physical facts
indicate that the trucks did not come into contact
with each other until the cab portions of each had
passed. The water tank of the defendants' truck
then came into contact with the side of the sheep
rack, and the degree of contact increased during
the entire length of plaintiff's rack as the trucks
passed, indicating that there was a gradual and increasing encroachment by the plaintiff's truck into
defendants' truck, which was proceeding on its side
of the road.
Defendant did not state that plaintiff never
crossed into his lane of traffic. Such a statement,
had it been made, may have fallen within the rule
upon which the plaintiff relies so desperately and
may have precluded his defense in the absence of
other evidence which would tend to contradict or
modify it.
Second, even if the rule as contended by the
plaintiff were to apply in the instant case, the facts
bring it within the exception stated within the rule
because there was favorable and competent testimony in the nature of physical evidence, as discussed
above, which was introduced at trial, tending to
contradict and modify any statement or inference
by defendant that plaintiff's truck did not cross
the center point of the highway. Had the defendant
testified that he observed the plaintiff's truck en11
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croaching upon his side of the highway at the instant of impact, such testimony would have been
strange indeed, and it is doubtful whether such a
statement would have been worthy of belief. Under
the circumstances the defendant's attention was directed to the road ahead of him, and he would have
had to have looked behind him at the instant of impact to have observed the precise position of plaintiff's truck upon the highway.
To hold that defendant must testify to the
observance of the act constituting negligence on
the part of plaintiff in order to state an effective
defense, would be to permit recovery by a negligent
motorist merely because the defendant and victim
of his negligence failed to observe plaintiff's precise violation. To so hold would be to ignore the whole
field of physical and circumstantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully concluded that the evidence
not only supports the findings of the trial court
but in fact preponderates in favor of the defendants.
The judgment of the Second District Court from
which this cause arises must be affirmed.
Resp~ctfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN
and ROBERT W. BRANDT
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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